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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

HEGLAR RANCH, INC.
an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

VSo

16830

LEONARD Me STILLMAN and
JUANITA P. STILLMAN,
husband and wife,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff-Respondent, Heglar Ranch, Inc., an Idaho
Corporation, owned by one Max Gillette and his wife, Elva (R-17),
brought this suit against the Defendants-Appellants, Mr. and Mrs.
Stillman, for non-payment of a promissory note.

Defendant-Appellant

Stillman responded with an answer containing nine purported defenses
and a counter-claim.

For clarity and brevity, the Plaintiff-

Respondent will be hereinafter referred to in this brief as "Heglar"
and the Defendants-Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Stillman, will be referred to as "Stillmans".
(R____ ).

References to the record will be as

Following discovery, including depositions, interrogatories

and affidavits filed by each of the parties, Heglar instituted a
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Heglar takes issue with the statement

that theSponsored
affidavits
of the parties were conflicting and submits that
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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\
a review of the Stillman affidavits and their answers to interrogatories, more fully discussed following, were incompetent and immaterial as evidence and were not conflicting in any evidentiary
sense.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Based upon the affidavits filed by Heglar, the Answers to
Interrogatories filed by the Stillmans and the depositions of the
Stillmans, the Lower Court granted summary judgment to the Plaintiff
Heglar in the sum of $25,000.00 upon the promissory note.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Heglar seeks the affirmation of the summary judgment
entered by the Lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Heglar has no particular disagreement with the
Statement of Facts as propounded by the Defendants Stillman except
that it is incomplete and does not adequately explain the background of the negotiations which led to the execution of the
promissory note and to the institution of this suit.
On May 12, 1978, Stillmans entered into an agreement
(R. 141-143, Depos. of Juanita Stillman, Ex. P-1) together with an
escrow agreement (R. 134-136, Depos. of Juanita Stillman, Ex. P-4)
which together constituted an agreement and escrow for the purchase
of real property in Salt Lake County by the Stillrnans from Heglar.
This agreement and escrow called for the deposit of $704,000.00
cash or certified funds into the escrow from Stillrnans to Heglar,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

at which time the Warranty Deed of Heglar, then in escrow, would
be delivered to the Stillmans.

Because of non-performance by the

Stillmans, the escrow was dissolved and the deed of Heglar returned to it (R. 101).

The transaction in total involved a three

party exchange and included a Mrs. Woods of Salt Lake County,
represented by Nolan Olsen, Esq., who are not parties to this
action but were involved in a corollary escrow by which Woods
would trade the Salt Lake County real property owned by them to
Heglar at which time Heglar would make the sale to Stillmans for
the agreed $704,000.00.
Stillmans totally failed to meet the conditions of the
agreement and the escrow of May 12, but subsequently represented
to the other interested parties, including Heglar, that they were
now in a position to obtain the funds and wished to reinstate
the escrow and proceed as previously planned.
"Supplement to Escrow Agreements"

Accordingly, a

(R. 138-140, Ex. P-2, Depos.

of Juanita Stillman R. 100) was executed by the parties, June 23,
1978.

This document recited the execution of the previous agree-

ment and escrow and the

termination "by reason of the failure

of Stillmans to deposit the said funds as agreed' (R. 138) and
provided by Paragraph 3 (R. 139) that as a condition of such reinstatement, that the Stillmans would execute two promissory notes
of $25,000.00 each, one being the promissory note subject to this
action and the other payable to the third party, Mrs. Woods.
agreement further provided (Para. 4) that in the event that
Stillmans failed to pay the escrow holders the agreed purchase
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
by the Utah State Library.
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The

price on or before June 29, 1978, that all escrow documents ineluding the promissory notes would be returned to Mr. George N.
Larsen, Attorney for Heglar, as agreed and liquidated damages
for non-performance by Stillmans.
Agreemen~was

This "Supplement to escrow

signed June 23 at the offices of McGhie Land Title

Company by each of the Stillmans in the presence of their own
counsel, Robert R. Brown, as well as the presence of W.
McDermaid, Title Officer, whose affidavit appears

c.

(R. 55-56).

Subsequently, the Stillmans again failed to meet the terms of the
agreement or the escrow and to pay the purchase price as agreed
and the notes were returned to Mr. Larsen who delivered Mrs. Woods
note to her and whose off ice brought this action on behalf of
Heglar to recover on the promissory note made to it according to
its terms (R. 137, Ex. P-3, Depos. of Juanita Stillman R. 101).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE JUDGMENT RENDERED
ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE SINCE THE FACTS AS CLAIMED BY
STILLMANS OWN EVIDENCE DO NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW
SUPPORT ANY FINDING OF DURESS.
The "Supplement to Escrow Agreements"

(R. 138-140, Ex.

P-2, Depos. of Juanita Stillman) and the promissory note subject
of this action (R. 137, Ex. P-3, Depos. of Juanita Stillman) were
executed by Stillmans on June 23, 1978.
at the time (R. 63, R. 146).

Their Counsel was present

The Defendants Stillman were aware

of the requirement of the note two or three days prior to this
- 4 -
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date, about June 21, 1978 (Defendant-Appellants Brief page 4,
also R. 65-66, R. 67).

The Plaintiff Heglar, following the

depositions of the Stillmans, served interrogatories on Stillmans
(R. 30-34).
(R. 35-43).

These interrogatories were answered by the Stillmans
By these answers, the Stillmans appeared to have

abandoned all of the nine defenses raised in their answer

as

well as their counter-claim, excepting only their claim that they
did not sign the promissory note (R. 137) willingly, it being the
claim of the Stillmans that they objected to the signing of the
promissory note, but nevertheless signed it "so they could secure
the contract papers from Mr. Larsen and deliver them to the bank"
(Defendant-Appellants Brief Page 3). The Defendants cite the
case of Fox v. Piercey, 119 Utah 367, 227 P 2d. 763 (Utah, 1951),
where the modern rule concerning duress is approved by this Court.
The rule is stated as follows

(p. 766):

"4. The modern rule that any wrongful act or threat
which actually puts the victim in such fear as to
compel him to act against his will constitutes
duress."
(Emphasis added)
Plaintiffs have no argument with this rule as adopted by the
Court except that it has no application in the instant case.

The

rule as adopted by this Court is further discussed in Corpus Juris
Secundum at Vol. 17 Contracts Paras. 168-179 inclusive wherein
the Court states, inter alia, at page 946, (and citing Fox v.
Piercey, supra):
"likewise, duress does not exist merely because a
party is induced to enter into a con~ract by reason
of adverse circumstances, and accordingly, mere
5 - provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for-digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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economic pressure or mere pecuniary distress, or
fear of financial embarrassment, does not of itself
amount to duress."
and again at page 967, paragraph 177:
"business compulsion vitiating a contract induced
thereby cannot be predicted on a demand which is lawful,
or an insistence on a legal right, or on a
threat to do what one has a legal right to do."
It is undisputed from the record that the Stillmans had entered
into a previous contract which they totally and wholly failed to
perform in any part.

When they initiated steps to reinstate the

contract, a condition was made, i.e. the promissory notes, of
which they were well aware, and which they signed in the presence
of their counsel.

It is understandable that they would have

preferred not to sign the promissory notes.

However, faced with

the condition required by parties who had already expended considerable time,·

trouble and substantial expense in a fruitless

effort to complete this transaction on the first occasion, they
chose to execute the notes with an outward show of complying with
the condition, but apparently with some private reservation as

to their intentions should they again fail to obtain their financing
It should be noted that the Court while adopting the
modern rule set out above in Fox v. Piercey supra went on to
state (P. 766)
"it is obvious that applying this subjective test
might theoretically degenerate to a point where a
person desiring to avoid a contract might claim that
practically any conduct of another put him in fear
and overcame his will.
It is necessary that there
be some objective standard for determining when duress
has been practiced.
It must appear that the threat
or act is of such a nature and made under such circumstances as to constitute a reasonable and adequate
Sponsored by thecause
S.J. Quinneyto
Law Library.
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Notwithstanding the fact that we approve this
modern and liberal rule as a test of whether or not
duress has been practiced, under all of the authorities
ancient and modern, the act or threat constituting
'
the duress must be wrongful .. "
(Emphasis added)
It should also be noted in the case of Fox v. Piercey that the
statements made by FireChief Piercey to Fox that unless Fox resigned
he would be discharged and that his discharge would be accompanied
by detrimental publicity, did not constitute duress as a matter of

law.
Heglar submits that the requirement of the promissory
note as a condition to renegotiating the contract while it might
have appeared inconvenient or even onerous to Stillmans, was not
a wrongful demand, but was within the legal rights of Heglar, was
readily acceded to by Stillmans, who only objected to the signing
when it became time to honor the promise as made.
POINT II
1

UPON THE EVIDENCE AS ADDUCED, IT WAS PROPER FOR THE
DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
THE PLAINTIFF.
It is Heglar's contention that upon all of the evidence
adduced by the Stillmans including their depositions (R.85-150),
their answers to interrogatories (R. 35-42), and the affidavits
of the Defendants, of their counsel and of Irene Strehle, heretofore discussed that they have failed to raise any material issue
of fact which would or could constitute a defense of duress.
(R.61-77).

First as to the depositions, the defendants admitted

the execution of Exhibits D-1, D-2, D-3 and D-4 (R. 91-92; R. 100-

101, R. 145-146).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendants answers to interrogatories either completely
evade the questions, as in interrogatory 1 and sub-interrogatories,
(R.35), admit a lack of knowledge, interrogatory 2 and sub-interrogatories (R. 36-37) and reassert only the feeble excuse that
the Stillmans preferred not to sign the note or did not want to
sign the note or objected to signing the note.

Nevertheless, to

obtain the potential fruits of their bargain they signed the promissory notes apparently with some mental reservation as to their
performance should they be unsuccessful in obtaining financing.
Also, the affidavits of the Stillmans and their counsel and of
Irene Strehle (R. 61-77) add nothing to the claim of Defendants
Stillman, except that they preferred not to sign the note but
were willing to sign it if it was necessary to obtain the possession
of the closing papers which they did in fact obtain (Def. Answers
to Interrogatories, 4C, .R. 38).
The function of affidavits in the consideration of a
motion for summary judgment has been considered in a number of Utah
cases.

See Preston v. Lamb 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P 2d 1021, at

page 1022, where the Court stated:
"Now, for an affidavit to be of effective use in the
determination of a motion for summary judgment, it
must set forth su9h facts as would be admissable
in evidence Rule 56E URCP.
Here the tendered
affidavit did not support the allegations of the
complaint which had been put in issue by the answer
of the defendant."
See also Montoya v. Berthaua Investment Company, 21 Utah 2d 37,
439 P 2d 853 at page 853 P 2d as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'~y employing the discovery process under the
rules, by affidavit and interrogatories directed
to each party by the other, they developed a clear
departur~ fr~m pleading and proof, that precipitated
no germane issue of fact, but one of law based
on the evidence submitted by both parties before
trial."

Also see Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P. 2d. 624 where it
is stated at page 367 P. 2d.
"Where as in the instant case the materials presented
by the moving party is sufficient to entitle him to
a directed verdict and the opposing party fails either
to offer counter-affidavits or other materials that
raise a credible issue or show that he has evidence
not then available, summary judgment may be rendered
for the moving party."
(Emphasis added)
See also, A & M Enterprises vs. Hunziker, 25 Ut 2d, 363, 482 Pac

2d 700.
There is one further aspect of the defendant's position
and the evidence and the lack thereof supporting it which deserves
attention.

In the third defense of Stillman's Answer (R.8) they

alleged that they had caused $10,000,000.00 to be made available to
the Bank of Utah but that the bank refused to accept the funds.
Questioned on this transaction by Heglar's Interrogatories No. 2-A
to G inclusive,

(R. 31) the defendants answered that the $10,000,000.00

dollars was made available to William Shaap, who was an officer of
the Bank of Utah.

However, in response to further questions they

were unable to state (R. 36)

(B) what officer, agent or employee

of the Bank of Utah refused to accept the tender of $10,000,000.00

{C) whether the tender was conditional or contingent in any respect,
(D} in what form the tender was made i.e. by Cashier's Check, transfer
of certified funds, cash or otherwise,

(E) whether any reason was

given forSponsored
the byrefusal
of the tender or (F) the owner of the
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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$10,000,000.00 which was "made available" to the Bank of Utah,
or even (G) the name and address of the persons representing
the owner of the $10,000,000.00 supposedly made available.

All

of this conversation about high finance is aptly summarized in
the affidavit of Bill Shaap (R. 50-51) when he states,inter
alia (R.50)
"Suddenly the telephone conversations took a different turn and a loan from the Bank of Utah became
involved. A person from Texas was claimed to have
substantial funds from a foreign source.
It was
proposed that this person place a substantial deposit
in the bank as a compensating balance to induce
the proposed loan, however, on inquiry the persons
involved refused to pledge this proposed deposit
as security for the loan. Accordingly, the request
was immediately and unequivocally denied. No deposit
was ever tendered to the Bank as such but only a
conversation indicating that the deposit would be
tendered if the loan was made. The Bank, of course,
would not refuse tender of any legitimate deposit,
unless there were unsatisfactory conditions made
a part of the tender."
Apparently what this caller with the proposed funds was proposing
was a deposit in the Bank of Utah, a very substantial loan from
the Bank of Utah, with the right reserved in the depositor to withdraw his deposit without any pledge of the same as security for
the loan.

The potential for loss

~f

not outright fraud) in this

situation is so apparent that it is hard to imagine that any person
would hope to find a banker naive enough, or so eager for a
deposit, as to accept such a potentially dangerous transaction,
practically custom made for a substantial and devastating loan
by a small bank and in fact a situation ripe for fraud.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Defendants
Stillman with the Affidavits filed, their answers to interrogatories and their depositions, have not established any wrongful
act on the part of the plaintiff Heglar and have only established
that they preferred not to sign a promissory note-or as events
developed, if they signed it, to avoid payment.

It is further

shown that under the law as adopted by the State of Utah there
must be a wrongful act or threat which puts the victim in such
fear as to compel him to act against his will.
not the case under the evidence adduced.

Such was clearly

The Stillmans acted,

according to their evidence, reluctantly and under terms other
than those they preferred, but nevertheless willingly in the hopes
that their plans would somehow be approved and they would obtain
an unsecured loan from the Bank of Utah.
It is further submitted that the evidence adduced by
Stillmans is incompetent and irrelevent to prove any material
issue of fact bearing on the ultimate issue of duress which is
attempted to be raised.

R

Submitted,

. HOBB
Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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